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Individual wealth-based selection 
supports cooperation in spatial 
public goods games
Xiaojie Chen1 & Attila Szolnoki2
In a social dilemma game group members are allowed to decide if they contribute to the joint venture 
or not. As a consequence, defectors, who do not invest but only enjoy the mutual benefit, prevail and 
the system evolves onto the tragedy of the common state. This unfortunate scenario can be avoided if 
participation is not obligatory but only happens with a given probability. But what if we also consider 
a player’s individual wealth when to decide about participation? To address this issue we propose a 
model in which the probabilistic participation in the public goods game is combined with a conditional 
investment mode that is based on individual wealth: if a player’s wealth exceeds a threshold value 
then it is qualified and can participate in the joint venture. Otherwise, the participation is forbidden 
in the investment interactions. We show that if only probabilistic participation is considered, spatially 
structured populations cannot support cooperation better than well-mixed populations where full 
defection state can also be avoided for small participation probabilities. By adding the wealth-based 
criterion of participation, however, structured populations are capable to augment network reciprocity 
relevantly and allow cooperator strategy to dominate in a broader parameter interval.
Cooperation is imperative when humans deal with problems of collective action, such as global warming, over-
population, overfishing or preserving natural resources1,2. The target is always clear but the emerging temptation 
is also apparent. The way how cooperation evolves in a population of rational individuals poses a puzzle: why 
should cooperators incur a cost to benefit others3? Evolutionary game theory is a powerful framework to study the 
problem of cooperation and many efforts have been considered in the past years to clarify the raised problem4–12.
One of the potentially promising avenues which can address the irreconcilable conflict of individual and 
collective benefits is when we consider personal wealth of players which is already the product of their past inter-
actions. Recent studies demonstrated that wealth heterogeneity and accumulation can promote cooperation13–20, 
but making wealth visible hinders the evolution of cooperation21–23. Although in the scenario of wealth hetero-
geneity the richer players generally contributes more than the poorer partner, high economic inequality leads 
higher-income individuals to be less generous22. In addition, voluntary participation has offered an escape route 
to avoid the tragedy of the common state24. Motivated by the latter option, Sasaki et al. investigated the evolution-
ary dynamics in the well-mixed public goods game with probabilistic participation rule25. Similar probabilistic 
participation in the prisoner’s dilemma game is found to favor the evolution of cooperation both in well-mixed 
and spatially structured populations26,27. Nevertheless previous works assumed that individuals have the initia-
tive to decide whether or not to participate in the joint venture. There are cases, however, when players should 
fulfill certain criterion for getting the chance to participate. We may quote that applying for a club-membership 
or other examples when a closed community demands a qualification process from newcomers. An assessment 
factor for qualification could be individual wealth. If the wealth is large enough, an applicant should be qualified 
who then decides whether or not to participate. Even if a successful qualification some may not participate in the 
investment club because participation may not necessarily be profitable when the group is occupied by cheaters 
or the participation fee is too high28,29.
Inspired by these real-life experiences in the present work we combine individual wealth with the probabilistic 
participation into the public goods game. Our principal goal is to clarify whether such conditional participation 
mode is able to promote cooperation better than the pure probabilistic participation mode mentioned earlier. We 
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assume that each individual has a varying wealth in the population. If the individual’s wealth exceeds a specific 
threshold value then the player is offered the opportunity to participate in the group effort. In the other case, 
when personal wealth is below the threshold then the player is disqualified and cannot participate in the joint 
venture. In agreement with previous works the qualified player’s choice is characterized by a probability factor. 
In case of positive decision the player pays a participation cost independently of his own strategy. Furthermore, 
a cooperator will also contribute to the common pool which will be enhanced and redistributed among all group 
members. Consequently, the individual’s wealth is updated based on the collected payoff. As we will show, spatial 
structure cannot promote the evolution of cooperation better than well-mixed interactions when only probabil-
istic participation rule is applied. The combination with the wealth-based investment mode, however, is capable 
to provide a feedback which can amplify the positive consequence of network reciprocity, hence the advantage of 
structured population is revealed.
Results
We first present the fraction of cooperators in the equilibrium state as a function of the participation cost g and 
the participation probability p. Figure 1(a) illustrates that when the participation probability is less than 0.6, full 
cooperation state is always achieved independently of the participation cost value, g. By using an intermediate 
value of participation probability, i.e., when 0.6 < p < 0.9, the fraction of cooperators first increases from zero 
until reaching a maximum value and then decreases as we increase the participation cost g. If we increase p 
further the system always terminates onto a full defection state regardless of the cost value g. Figure 1(b) shows 
the fraction of qualified individuals, whose individual wealth exceeds the threshold level WT in the equilibrium 
state. This panel highlights that all individuals are qualified to participate in the investment game if p is less than 
0.4 no matter how high participation cost in involved. This observation supports a previous finding, namely rare 
interactions reveal the positive consequence of cooperator strategy30. For an intermediate values of participa-
tion probability, when 0.4 < p < 0.6, the actual value of g becomes decisive: if the participation cost is small, all 
individuals are qualified, but their fraction decreases gradually as we increase g. Increasing p further the role of g 
becomes irrelevant again. It is because too frequent interactions provide an easy target for defectors who prevail 
and pull down the average individual wealth. As a result, all players become disqualified during the evolutionary 
process. Our last panel in Fig. 1(c) suggests that there is a strong correlation between the fraction of cooperators 
and qualified players. A player’s wealth can only be maintained if he cooperates with other group members other-
wise the failure of group product will reflect on individual success. In this way the wealth-based investment rule 
can augment the network reciprocity mechanism effectively.
In order to identify the pure consequence of wealth-based investment mode on the evolution we now inves-
tigate the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in well-mixed population without involving the wealth factor, 
that is, applying formally WT = − ∞ . According to the replicator equation, we find that there exists a critical 
participation probability p* below which the state of full cooperation is the only stable state in the system, that is, 
cooperators dominate the whole population (see Methods). While for p > p*, the system always terminates onto 
the full defection state. We find that the p* critical value depends both on the value of the group size N and the 
enhancement factor r. More precisely, p* decreases with increasing group size N, while it increases with increasing 
the enhancement factor r. This behavior is summarized in Fig. 2(a). For the sake of comparison, we also plot in 
Fig. 2(b) the equilibrium fraction of cooperators for WT = − ∞ in spatially structured populations by using the 
parameter settings of Fig. 1. The right panel in Fig. 2 highlights that cooperators cannot survive in spatial struc-
ture for p > 0.6 practically independently of the participation cost value, but they dominate the whole system 
for p < 0.6. We note that the critical value p* is approximately equal to 0.6 that is the critical value of well-mixed 
population for the same parameter values [Fig. 2(a)]. These results indicate that spatially structured population 
cannot facilitate the evolution of cooperation significantly, comparing with well-mixed population if only prob-
abilistic participation mode is applied. The comparison of Figs 1(a) and 2(b), however, clearly demonstrates that 
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Figure 1. The stationary outcome of evolutionary dynamics in spatially structured populations driven by 
wealth-based investment mode. Panel (a) shows the equilibrium fraction of cooperators in dependence on 
the participation cost g and the participation probability p. Panel (b) shows the fraction of qualified individuals 
whose wealth exceeds the threshold value, while panel (c) shows the fraction of cooperators among qualified 
players. Other parameters: r = 3.0, WT = 0, W0 = 50, and L = 100.
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the combination of wealth-based investment with probabilistic participation can provide cooperation supporting 
environment in structured population.
To get a deeper understanding about the microscopic process that is responsible for the cooperator supposing 
mechanism in spatially structured populations, we present a series of snapshots of strategy evolution for three 
representative participation cost values in Fig. 3. When producing the snapshots we use different colors not just 
to distinguish cooperator and defector strategies, but also to mark their wealth status which determines if they 
are qualified to participate in the game or not. More precisely, blue (yellow) color denotes cooperators (defectors) 
whose wealth exceeds the WT threshold level, while green (red) color denotes cooperators (defectors) whose 
wealth is below the threshold level hence they are disqualified from the game.
For small participation cost, as shown in the top row of Fig. 3, both cooperators and defectors remain qualified 
to participate in the games which offers an easy prey for defectors. Because of the small cost cooperators do not 
turn to “green state” which would reduce their exploitation by defectors. As a result, blue cooperators vanish and 
yellow defectors prevail. However, these “yellow” defectors’ wealth decreases gradually because they are unable to 
exploit others anymore and instead they still have to pay the participation cost. Consequently, the whole system 
turns into “red state” at the end.
For intermediate participation cost, illustrated in the middle row of Fig. 3, defectors can exploit cooperators 
at the beginning of the evolution, but they still turn to “red” state quickly due to the increased participation 
cost. Cooperators are facing to the same problem therefore they also switch from “blue” to “red” state. Only 
those cooperators can maintain their qualifications who are deep in the middle of a surviving cooperator domain 
because the enhanced benefit of public goods game can compensate the relative high value of g. Interestingly, they 
remain protected from being exploited by defectors, because a shield of “green” cooperators will prevent defector 
players to contact directly with qualified, hence vulnerable, cooperators. In other words, the failure of cooperators 
in the vicinity of defectors will block the propagation of defector strategy. Finally, blue and green cooperators 
coexist in the population.
For large participation cost, as shown in the bottom row of Fig. 3, defectors are capable to beat cooperators at 
the early stage of evolution because there are no organized cooperator clusters due to random initial condition. 
As earlier, large homogeneous defector cluster become disqualified (they change from yellow to red) because they 
cannot compensate the large participation fee from the income of games. Similar erosion can be observed for blue 
cooperators because they are unable to maintain the threshold level of wealth even if the absence of defectors in 
the neighborhood. As a result, both defectors and cooperators become disqualified and a voter-model-like neutral 
drift starts between the red and green domains. This slow evolution will eventually result in a homogeneous state 
where the probability of arriving at one of the possible final destinations is proportional to the initial portions of 
the mentioned strategies31,32.
To explore the robustness of our findings we have applied several different values of wealth threshold WT. As 
Fig. 4(a) indicates clearly the non-monotonous dependence of cooperation level on the participation cost g can 
still be observed for a wide range of WT interval. Correspondingly, full cooperation state can always be reached at 
intermediate values of the participation cost g. The only role of the value of WT is when to reach the full-C state. 
As the first panel of Fig. 4 shows, lower threshold value requires a higher cost to reveal the collective benefit of 
cooperator strategy. In the middle panel we have plotted the fraction of qualified players in dependence of par-
ticipation cost for different WT values. Figure 4(b) shows that the number of qualified players is maximized at 
Figure 2. Evolutionary dynamics obtained by probabilistic participation in the absence of wealth-based 
investment rule. Panel (a) shows the critical participation probability p* below which cooperators dominate the 
population in dependence on the group size N for different values of the enhancement factor r in well-mixed 
populations. Panel (b) shows the fraction of cooperators in dependence on the participation cost g and the 
participation probability p in spatially structured populations. In the latter case other parameters are r = 3.0 and 
L = 100.
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Figure 3. Evolution of spatial strategy distribution starting from a random initial state for three 
representative values of participation cost. Top row [from (a–d)] depicts the time evolution for small cost 
(g = 0.1), middle row [from (e–h)] depicts the evolution for intermediate cost (g = 1), while the bottom row 
[from (i–l)] denotes the evolution for high cost (g = 2). Cooperators (defectors) whose wealth exceeds the WT 
threshold value are denoted by blue (yellow), while cooperators (defectors) whose wealth is below the threshold 
are denoted by green (red). Other parameters are p = 0.7, r = 3.0, W0 = 50, WT = 0, and L = 100.
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Figure 4. Panel (a) depicts the equilibrium cooperation level as a function of participation cost g for different 
values of wealth threshold WT. Other parameters are p = 0.6, W0 = 50, and L = 100. The legend for WT value is in 
the middle panel. Panels (b,c) depict the fraction of qualified players and qualified cooperators respectively by 
using the same parameter values as stated for panel (a).
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
5Scientific RepoRts | 6:32802 | DOI: 10.1038/srep32802
an intermediate g value. This maximum is more pronounced as we increase the WT value. Figure 4(c), where we 
plotted the fraction of qualified cooperators, suggests that our previous conclusion about the strong correlation of 
cooperative state and qualification is broadly valid, which explains why wealth-based selection rule augments the 
positive consequence of network reciprocity.
To complete our study we also investigated the fraction of strategies in dependence of participation cost 
for different initial wealth endowments, W0. Our observations are summarized in Fig. 5. We find that the 
non-monotonous dependence of cooperation level on the participation cost g can still be observed for wide 
variety of W0. The only role of W0 is that it may cover the destructive consequence of defection: if W0 is too high 
then all players are qualified in the system hence we get back the original public goods game where network rec-
iprocity can support cooperation only in a limited way. If, however, the initial endowment of players is low then 
positive feedback of wealth-based selection manifests immediately providing a significantly higher cooperation 
level. This argument is justified by Fig. 5(b,c) where the most striking change can be observed at small W0 values. 
In other words, if the initial endowment of players is too high then we have no chance to observe the sophisticated 
mechanism we described above.
Discussion
In public goods games it is a generally used assumption that all players have a chance to participate in the joint 
venture. But this postulation cannot be always justified. There are examples when a certain criterion should be 
fulfilled by the applicants before entering the investment club. Motivated by this real-life experience we have 
proposed a so-called wealth-based selection rule in the framework of spatial public goods game and combined it 
with the previously studied probabilistic participation rule. Indeed, probabilistic participation has been consid-
ered and studied in well-mixed and spatially structured populations both for two-player and multi-player games 
by some previous works25,27. It is found that probabilistic participation can promote the evolution of cooperation 
both in well-mixed and spatially structured populations. However, it is worth mentioning that these works have 
considered probabilistic participation in well-mixed populations or in structured populations independently and 
have not compared the possible impact of topology. Therefore it remained unclear whether population structures 
can play a positive role on the evolution of cooperation if probabilistic participation rule is applied. An intuitive 
answer to this question would be that cooperation is better promoted in structured populations because the latter 
gives a chance for spatial reciprocity to work8. Surprisingly, our comparison revealed that structured populations 
cannot properly enhance the cooperation level in comparison to well-mixed populations. In particular, the crit-
ical value of the participation probability which separates the full-cooperation state from full-defection state is 
very similar for both cases.
When we also apply wealth-based selection rule, however, the positive consequence of interaction topology 
becomes evident. In the latter case the full-cooperator state can be reached even at large participation probability 
if participation cost is appropriately chosen. Moreover, we have shown that using a large wealth threshold or a 
small starting wealth endowment can also boost the evolution of cooperation. Interestingly, the role of these 
parameters are conceptually similar because they help to establish cooperator supporting conditions which reveal 
the significantly different consequences of competing strategies. While defection is destructive hence a defector 
cannot maintain high wealth value on the expense of neighbors, a cooperator player is able to remain qualified 
by supporting group members mutually. This explains why this selection mechanism is capable to magnify the 
positive impact of network reciprocity.
As we have already emphasized, our wealth-based selection rule is motivated by real-life observations. Indeed, 
individual wealth has been considered in some previous works where individual wealth distribution was fixed33–35. 
Here the heterogeneity of wealth distribution was proved to be beneficial to cooperation34, which fits concep-
tually to the positive impact of social interactions36 or interaction graph heterogeneity33. In our present work 
individual wealth is not just a varying quantity but also plays a selection criterion to judge whether an individual 
Figure 5. Panel (a) depicts the equilibrium cooperation level as a function of participation cost g for different 
values of initial wealth endowment W0. Other parameters are p = 0.7, WT = 0, and L = 100. The legend for 
W0 value is in the middle panel. Panels (b,c) depict the fraction of qualified players and qualified cooperators 
respectively by using the same parameter values as stated for panel (a).
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is qualified or not for participating in a game. The key message of present model study is wealth, as the result of 
individual success, should not only be the target of evolution, but also driving force of selection mechanism. This 
observation supports our general intuition that in long run success-driven coevolutionary rules are helpful for 
cooperation37–42.
Methods
Model with wealth-based participation in spatially structured populations. The game is staged on 
a L × L square lattice with periodic boundary conditions. Each player on site x with von Neumann neighborhood 
is a member of five overlapping groups of size N = 5, and it is initially designated either as a cooperator (sx = 1) or 
defector (sx = 0) with equal probability. During the interaction stage at time t, if each individual x′ wealth Wx(t) is 
less than the threshold WT, individual x is not allowed to participate in the public goods game. Otherwise, it tends 
to participate in the public goods game with a probability p. When individual x participates in the public goods 
game, he has to pay a participation cost g first independently of his strategy. Then, participating cooperators invest 
a fixed amount c to the common pool, while participating defectors invest nothing.
According to the previously established rules, when individual x participates in the game centered by a player 
i, his payoff from the group i is Π = − −rN c N s c g/x
i
PC P x , where NP is the number of participants and NPC is the 
number of cooperators among the participants. Note that NPC ≤ NP ≤ N because of the qualification rule. It is 
worth mentioning that when only one individual participates in the game (i.e., Np = 1), the player can still receive 
the investment return from the game if it is a cooperator. When all participants invest into the pool, each obtains 
a payoff (r − 1)c − g, which is assumed to be positive value29. Furthermore, without losing generality24, c is set to 
one in this work. If a player x is not allowed to participate in the game or does not participate in the game then his 
payoff is Π = 0x
i . Since an individual x belongs to N different groups his total payoff Π x is simply accumulated 
from all related Πx
i  incomes.
After playing the games with all available neighbors, the individual wealth value is updated
+ = + ΠW t W t( 1) ( ) , (1)x x x
where Π x is the total payoff of player x obtains at time t. In the beginning all players are given an initial endow-
ment Wx(0) = W0, which is higher than WT. Otherwise the evolution would be trapped in a frozen state.
After each round, a player x is given the opportunity to imitate the strategy of a randomly selected nearest 
neighbour y. The strategy transfer occurs with the probability
=
+  Π − Π


q
K
1
1 exp ( )/
,
(2)x y
where K characterizes the uncertainty by strategy adoptions43. Without losing generality44, we use K = 0.5, so that 
it is very likely that better performing players will be followed, although those performing worse may occasionally 
be imitated as well.
As the key quantity, we measure the stationary fraction of cooperators ρ = ∑ ∞−L s ( )c x x
2 , where sx(∞ ) 
denotes the strategy of player x when the system reaches dynamical equilibrium, i.e., when the average coopera-
tion level becomes time-independent. Moreover, to get a better statistics the final outcome is averaged over 100 
independent runs.
Analysis for the case of qualified game in well-mixed populations. For studying the evolutionary 
dynamics in infinite well-mixed populations without involving the wealth factor, we use the replicator equation45. 
Initially we assume that a fraction x of the population is formed by cooperators while the remaining fraction 
(1 − x) are defectors. The related replicator equation is
= − Π − Πx x x(1 )( ), (3)C D
where Π C and Π D are the average payoffs of cooperators and defectors, respectively. Next, let groups of N individ-
uals be sampled randomly from the population. The average payoff of cooperators is Π = − ⋅ + ⋅ Πp p(1 ) 0C C
P, 
where the ΠC
P payoff of participating cooperators is
∑ ∑Π = − −





 −




+
+
− −




.
=
−
− −
=
−( )N i p p ij x x r j ci c g1 (1 ) (1 ) ( 1)1 (4)CP i
N
i N i
j
i
j i j
0
1
1
0
Similarly, the average payoff of defectors is Π = − ⋅ + ⋅ Πp p(1 ) 0D D
P , where the ΠD
P  payoff of participating 
defectors is
∑ ∑Π = − −





 −



 +
−




.
=
−
− −
=
−( )N i p p ij x x rjci g1 (1 ) (1 ) 1 (5)DP i
N
i N i
j
i
j i j
0
1
1
0
With these definitions, the replicator equation has two boundary equilibria, namely x = 0 and x = 1. On the other 
hand, interior equilibria can be determined by the roots of the function g(x) = Π C − Π D, thus obtaining
=




− −




− .g x rc
N
p pc( ) 1 (1 )
(6)
N
It follows that g(x) is independent of x, and there is no interior equilibria in (0, 1).
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For the stability analysis of the replicator equation, we need to know the sign of g(x) function. To determine 
it we define the continuous function h(p) = g(x). It follows that h(0) = 0 and h(1) = (r/N − 1)c < 0. Moreover, h′ 
(p) = [r(1 − p)N−1 − 1]c with h′ (0) = (r − 1)c > 0 and h″ (p) = − (N − 1)rc(1 − p)N−2 < 0. We can thus conclude that 
h(p) is positive near p = 0, and h(p) has a unique interior root p* in (0, 1) with h(p*) = 0, which yields the follow-
ing conclusions about the stability analysis.
(1)  For p ∈ (0, p*), h(p) > 0 so that Π C − Π D > 0. As a result, x = 1 is a stable equilibrium, while x = 0 is an  
unstable equilibrium.
(2)  For p ∈ (p*, 1], h(p) < 0 so that Π C − Π D < 0. As a result, x = 0 is a stable equilibrium, while x = 1 is unstable 
equilibrium.
(3) For p = 0 or p = p*, h(p) = 0 so that Π C − Π D = 0. As a result, the game becomes equivalent to neutral drift.
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